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COMPUTER AS CONFIDANT: DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE
AND THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD
NICOLE G. IANNARONE 1
Automated investment advisers permeate the investment industry. 2
Digital investment advisers are the fastest growing segment of financial technology (FinTech) and are disrupting traditional investment advisory delivery
models. 3 Proponents of digital investment advice, a platform also known as
“robo-advisers,” claim that they can provide fiduciary level investment advisory services at a fraction of the cost of traditional human investment advisers. Critics disagree. Nevertheless, by 2020, robo-advisers will digitally
manage $2 trillion in assets, growing over 3,000% from 2015. 4 One industry
observer predicts that in five years, “[r]obo-advisory services will become
mainstream.” 5 Robo-advisers are becoming so ubiquitous that the Chartered
Financial Analyst (CFA) examination will, beginning in 2019, expand the
examination areas to include questions on “artificial intelligence, automated

1. Assistant Clinical Professor and Director, Investor Advocacy Clinic, Georgia State University
College of Law. Thank you to Benjamin P. Edwards and W. Edward Afield for their feedback on earlier
drafts of this article.
2. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum,
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.html
[https://perma.cc/E4XG-3FU4] (“The last few years have seen rapid growth in the availability and popularity of automated investment advisory programs. “).
3. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, BLURRED LINES: HOW FINTECH IS SHAPING FINANCIAL
SERVICES
3
(2016),
https://www.pwc.com/il/en/home/assets/pwc_fintech_global_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VF9Q-R8A5] (“FinTech is a dynamic segment at the intersection of the financial services and technology sectors where technology-focused start-ups and new market entrants innovate the
products and services currently provided by the traditional financial services industry.”); CHARTERED
FIN. ANALYST INST., FINTECH SURVEY REPORT 16 (2016), https://www.cfainstitute.org/Survey/fintech_survey.PDF (“[R]obo-advisers are still considered to be the technology that will have the
greatest impact on financial services industry both 1 year and 5 years from now.”).
4. ACCENTURE, THE RISE OF ROBO-ADVICE 2 (2015), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-2/Accenture-Wealth-Management-Rise-of-Robo-Advice.pdf [https://perma.cc/EFG3-GHX3]
(projecting robo-advisers at end of 2015 to manage “between $55 billion and $60 billion”); A.T.
KEARNEY, HYPE VS. REALITY: THE COMING WAVES OF “ROBO” ADOPTION 26 (2015),
https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7132014/Hype+vs.+Reality_The+Coming+Waves+of+Robo+Adoption.pdf/9667a470-7ce9-4659-a104-375e4144421d [http://perma.cc/YS77CAHK] (predicting $2 trillion under robo-adviser management by 2020); SEC, OS-1114, FINTECH
FORUM
TRANSCRIPT
21
(2016),
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fintech/transcript-111416.pdf
[https://perma.cc/53JC-R6EG] [hereinafter SEC, FINTECH FORUM] (robo-adviser industry “could grow
to as large as 2.2 trillion dollars in assets under management by the year 2020.”).
5. A.T. KEARNEY, supra note 4, at 10.
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investment services and mining unconventional sources of data.” 6 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulators began examining digital investment advisers in 2017. 7
The computer-led investment advisory service model may be growing
particularly quickly due to a confluence of social and political factors including an increased regulatory focus on the different standards applicable to investment advice providers, a so-called retirement gap with a lack of
affordable investment advice, and an increasing comfort with digital platforms. 8 This short article begins by describing those factors in Part I before
discussing, in Part II, the wide-ranging definitions of robo-advisers and categories of distinction between them. Part III shifts the focus to the regulatory
framework and standard of care owed by robo-advisers operating under the
Investment Advisers Act. The essay concludes with a two-pronged recommendation for the regulation of robo-advisers in the near term. First, regulators should deploy existing regulatory tools such as examination,
enforcement, and disclosure to explore the sufficiency and malleability of
their current parameters before constructing any new regulatory schemes.
Second, the disclosure device should be studied to determine whether the
intended beneficiary of the disclosure, a retail investor, comprehends the information being disclosed to them and whether changes to the format, delivery, and/or content of disclosures would better protect consumer investors.
I. INVESTMENT ADVICE GOES ONLINE: THE BIRTH AND GROWTH OF
ROBO-ADVISERS
The majority of the 140 robo-adviser platforms created since 2008 began operations in the past three years. 9 At the same time, Americans are not

6. Trevor Hunnicutt, CFA Exam to Add Artificial Intelligence, “Big Data” Questions, REUTERS
(May 23, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-investment-tech-cfa/cfa-exam-to-add-artificial-intelligence-big-data-questions-idUSKBN18J2R4 [https://perma.cc/RGM4-DAZ2].
7. SEC, EXAMINATION PRIORITIES FOR 2017 2 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/national-examination-program-priorities-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5JC-TLP4] (describing
examination of robo-advisers as priority); Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote
Address at the SEC-Rock Center on Corporate Governance Silicon Valley Initiative (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-white-silicon-valley-initiative-3-31-16.html
[https://perma.cc/YT94-EKDS] (“As part of our effort to monitor emerging automated investment models, staff from our National Exam Program are examining robo-advisors.”).
8. Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Overview, SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N,
http://www.sifma.org/issues/legal,-compliance-and-administration/digitial-investment-advice/overview/
[http://perma.cc/2VMS-F9BB] (listing factors tied to robo-advisers’ rapid rise).
9. BLACKROCK, DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBO ADVISORS COME OF AGE 5 (2016),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investment-adviceseptember-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQT5-PS4F] (“Nearly 140 digital advisory companies have been
founded since 2008, with over 80 of those founded in the past two years.”).
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ready for retirement and exhibit overall low levels of financial literacy. The
robo-advice industry’s growth tracks societal changes encouraging investment in and use of increasingly better technological tools and seizes upon
opportunities presented by digital native investors who may be financially
inexperienced and wary of high fees. Moreover, increased governmental focus on advice standards has fueled robo-advisers’ growth.
A. American Investing Confidence, Competence, and Retirement
Readiness
America may be in the midst of a retirement “crisis.” 10 Americans lack
a foundation in basic financial and investing concepts and have “relatively
low levels of financial literacy.” 11 Over half of Americans have made no
attempt to determine their future retirement needs. 12 Most American workers
are now responsible for their own retirement, with a precipitous drop in access to defined benefit plans. 13 Reviewing recent studies, the SEC’s Office
of the Investor Advocate reported that most households over the age of 55
“have no retirement savings in a defined contribution plan or individual retirement account, and nearly 30 percent of households age 55-and-older have
no retirement savings and no defined benefit (e.g. pension) plan.” 14 For those
who do have retirement savings, the median amount saved is $20,000 and
most between the ages of 50 and 75 have retirement savings below
$25,000. 15 In addition, the use of professional advisers to assist investors in
managing their assets is the exception rather than the rule, with less than one
10. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. INV’R EDUC. FOUND., FINANCIAL CAPABILITY IN THE
UNITED STATES 2016, at 16 (2016),
http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6MQ-EWYS] (“[S]tudies have warned that the U.S. faces a retirement savings crisis.”).
11. Id. at 28.
12. Id. at 15 (“Thirty-nine percent of respondents have tried to figure out how much they need to
save for retirement, while 56% have not.”).
13. Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment Advisers Act After
Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 419–20 (2016) (describing steep decline in
access to defined benefit pension plans and increase of Americans participating in defined contribution
plans); SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 25 (“[W]e have a generation of people who won’t have
access to defined benefits quite the same way that past generations have, where maybe Social Security
Administration has told people not to depend on the full benefit today.”); Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 303, 305 (2008) (“Today’s reality is that
investing is no more an optional activity for most American adults than is working. American workers
are increasingly expected to assume responsibility for their financial security in retirement, and thus have
no choice but to invest in the markets.”).
14. OFFICE OF THE INV’R ADVOCATE, SEC, PERSPECTIVES ON RETIREMENT READINESS IN THE
UNITED STATES: A WHITE PAPER 2 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/advocate/staff-papers/white-papers/retirement-readiness-white-paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/NN6G-DDH2].
15. Id. at 4.
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third of Americans receiving investment advice. 16 Yet professional advice
may benefit investors. 17
B. Consumers’ Comfort with Computers Increases
FinTech, including robo-advisers, appeals most to younger investors. 18
Experts predicted that millennials would be the prototypical robo-advisory
client because they are digital natives comfortable with online service delivery. 19 While that initial predication was correct, 20 later studies showed that
digital investment advisory services appeal to all generations. 21 Robo-adviser Betterment reports “the average age [of an investor customer] is around
35, which is on the cusp of millennial, but around 30 percent of our business
comes from people over 50 years old.” 22 Investors may prefer the lack of
direct human-adviser control as well as the flexibility of accessing infor-

16. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3 (“[O]nly 28% of individuals surveyed use a professional financial advisor”).
17. Bo Lu, CEO of FutureAdvisor, believes “many more people in the U.S. would benefit from
advice than receive it today or have ready access to it today.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 24.
18. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH. INV’R EDUC. FOUND., INVESTORS IN THE UNITED STATES
2016,
at
8
(2016),
http://www.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_Inv_Survey_Full_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QM8V-P4B8] (“Usage of ‘robo-advisors’ is higher among younger investors and those who do not otherwise work with a financial advisor.”);
id. at 20 (“Younger investors are less likely to use professional advisors, more likely to use ‘robo-advisors’”); Survey Finds Affluent Millennials & Gen Xers Will Move More Assets to Advisors over Next
Decade, INV. WKLY. NEWS, May 27, 2017, at 515 (detailing survey finding that Gen X and Millennials
expect financial advisers to leverage technology while providing financial advisory services).
19. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 7 (“Digital advice can increase the likelihood that people will
engage on financial advice, particularly because younger generations may be more accustomed to electronic forms of communication.”).
20. Matt Egan, Robo Advisors: The Next Big Thing in Investing, CNN MONEY (June 18, 2015, 2:44
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/18/investing/robo-advisor-millennials-wealthfront/index.html.
[https://perma.cc/A6T8-AR7F] (“Millennials, who often don’t have enough money to qualify for traditional advisors, are big users for robo advisors.”); ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 7 (“Robo-advice fills a
void for millennials . . . .”); PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3.
21. BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, UPDATE TO THE REPORT ON THE IOSCO
AUTOMATED ADVICE TOOLS SURVEY 9 (2016), www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD552.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UJJ6-94EB] [hereinafter IOSCO UPDATE] (“[T]he primary market for automated advice is millennials (born between 1980 and 2000), but that other age groups such as Generation X (born
between 1965 and 1980), as well as subsequent generations are making use of these tools.”); Press Release, Capital One Investing, Retirement Confidence Dips in 2017 (Mar. 13, 2017), https://content.capitaloneinvesting.com/mgdcon/core/aboutus/press/20170310_Financial-Freedom-Survey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XWR2-VRU7] (“Millennials also most value robo-advice, with 65 percent saying it can
enhance financial peace of mind, compared to 53 percent of Generation X and 31 percent of Baby Boomers.”).
22. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 34.
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mation on their own coupled with the learning opportunities that digital investment services provide. 23 A digital platform offered over a desktop or
mobile device is not constrained by a human adviser’s office hours, allowing
investors to access their account information at any time. 24 Robo-advisers’
separation of investments, account information, and investor education from
a person, set hours, and an office also affords investors a measure of privacy
and control not necessarily available in a traditional advisory relationship. 25
It is this instant access to information that makes some robo-advisers believe
that their services appeal to both smaller investors and more sophisticated
investors with higher account balances. 26
C. Legislation and Regulatory Activity Focuses Attention on Investment Advice
Recent legislative and regulatory activity has focused attention on roboadvisors. 27 Although it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully articulate
the differences between investment advice providers, in general, only investment advisers required to register under the 1940 Investment Advisers Act
(1940 Act) or a state equivalent uniformly owe their clients a fiduciary duty
while other providers of investment advice, which can include broker-dealers, financial planners, and insurance agents, do not uniformly owe fiduciary
duties to their clients. 28 The disparate standards applicable to professionals
23. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 5 (“There are also elements of the robo-advice experience that
clients prefer over traditional models. They like the privacy offered by a digital solution and the ability
to learn, and to chart their own path.”).
24. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 4 (benefits of robo-advisors include “the ability to interact with
the tools 24/7”).
25. Falguni Desai, The Great FinTech Robo Advisor Race, FORBES (July 31, 2016, 11:54 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/07/31/the-great-fintech-robo-adviserrace/#57f979a94a6f [http://perma.cc/C2H4-ERW4].
26. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 33.
27. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3, 8 (“[R]ecent changes to regulation . . . have resulted in a
greater focus on digital advice as a potential solution to provide low-cost investment advice with appropriately tailored outcomes to individual investors at scale.”).
28. Only one category of individuals providing investment advice are uniformly fiduciaries: individuals who qualified as investment advisers under the 1940 Investment Advisers Act or a similar state
regulation. Others who may provide investment advice, including broker-dealers, insurance agents, and
financial planners, were not, absent some exceptions, required to provide fiduciary-level advice and are
regulated, if at all, under different standards of care. Scholars have extensively detailed the differences
between the standards governing investment advisers and broker-dealers, with some recommending harmonization of those standards to a unitary fiduciary duty for all providers of investment advice to eliminate consumer confusion. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and
Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701 (2010) (describing differences between broker-dealer and investment adviser regulation and application of fiduciary standard); Steven D. Irwin et al., Wasn’t My
Broker Always Looking Out for My Best Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L. J.
41, 61 (2009) (“A consistent fiduciary duty standard would likely help to increase investor trust.”); Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
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nearly indistinguishable to the investing public has led to calls to harmonize
the treatment of all providers of investment advice. 29
Significant attention to investment advice regulation began following
the 2008 economic crisis. The 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act directed the SEC to study the differing standards
of care that broker-dealers and investment advisers owe their clients and to
identify any regulatory gaps that should be closed to better protect retail consumers. 30 While the SEC’s study has been completed and resulted in staff
recommendations for a uniform fiduciary standard, 31 the SEC has not yet
proposed any new regulation. On April 6, 2016, the Department of Labor
(DOL) released its final version of a “fiduciary rule” that would require all
persons providing investment advice to tax qualified retirement accounts to
adhere to a fiduciary standard. 32 Promulgated after significant study, debate,
and a lengthy notice and comment period, the fiduciary rule would result in
a major shift in regulation of financial advice. 33
Robo-advisers received significant attention during the DOL fiduciary
rule debate. The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) predicted
that the fiduciary rule would lead its broker-dealer members to abandon IRA
accounts under $25,000 due to prohibitively high compliance costs. 34 Moreover, while acknowledging that robo-advice may benefit “some classes of
Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59 (2010) (describing differences in regulation between
broker-dealers and investment advisers and arguing for professionalism as opposed to fiduciary standard).
Cf. Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91
B.U. L. REV. 1051 (2011) (arguing that fiduciary duty now recognized as arising out of the 1940 Act may
be a faulty premise).
29. See, e.g., Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented Regulation of Investment
Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47 (2014); see also Ryan
K. Bakhtiari et al., The Time for a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Is Now, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 313 (2013).
30. Black, supra note 28, at 59–61; James S. Wrona, The Best of Both Worlds: A Fact-Based Analysis of the Legal Obligations of Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and a Framework for Enhanced
Investor Protection, 68 BUS. LAW. 1, 5–7 (2012).
31. SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER DEALERS, at ii (2011),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MYX-TFRL].
32. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule–Retirement Investment Advice;
Best Interest Contract Exemption (Prohibition Transaction Exemption 2016-01); Class Exemption for
Principal Transactions in Certain Assets Between Investment Advice Fiduciaries and Employee Benefit
Plans and IRAs (Prohibited Transaction Exemption 2016-02); Prohibited and Transaction Exemptions
75–1, 77–4, 80–83, 83–1, 84–24 and 86–128, 82 Fed. Reg. 12319 (proposed Mar. 2, 2017) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2510), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2017-03-02/pdf/2017-04096.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/9AB8-DUB7]. By virtue of its oversight of ERISA, the Department of Labor issues
rules concerning tax advantaged retirement accounts such as individual retirement accounts and 401(k)
accounts, among others. See Karmel, supra note 13, at 423–424 (describing obligations of fiduciaries
under ERISA).
33. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 13, at 424–25 (describing critiques of fiduciary rule).
34. Letter from Marcia E. Asquith, Senior Vice President, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., to the U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, RE: Proposed Conflict of Interest Rule and Related Proposals, RIN-1210-AB32, at 5–6
(July 17, 2015), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/FINRACommentLetter_DOL_07-17-15.pdf
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knowledgeable investors,” FINRA commented that for many others, “roboadvice is a poor substitute for a financial adviser who understands the customer’s needs and guides the customer through market turbulence or life
events.” 35 On the other hand, DOL leadership predicted that robo-advisers
could make it possible for exponentially more investors to receive fiduciary
level investment advice at lower costs. 36 Robo-advisory firms claimed that
they had already been providing advice meeting a fiduciary standard as registered investment advisers under the 1940 Act. 37 Scholars likewise argued
that the elimination of a commission-based fee structure “would likely accelerate the growth of so-called robo-advisers.” 38
President Trump executed a Presidential Memorandum on February 3,
2017 directing the DOL “to examine the Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine
whether it may adversely affect the ability of Americans to gain access to
retirement information and financial advice.” 39 As a result, full implementation has been delayed repeatedly and the fiduciary rule may ultimately be
revised or eliminated. 40 Nevertheless, the DOL’s efforts to mandate that all

[http://perma.cc/B66X-F9AA]; see also Paul R. Walsh & David W. Johns, Can the Retail Investor Survive the Fiduciary Standard?, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 437, 449 (2013) (“[T]he imposition of a fiduciary
duty onto the broker or salesman will create a barrier to the availability of investment advice to the small
investor.”).
35. Asquith, supra note 34, at 6.
36. Restricting Access to Financial Advice: Evaluating the Costs and Consequences for Working
Families and Retirees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health, Emp’t, Labor, & Pensions of the H.
Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 114th Cong. 102 (2015) (testimony of Hon. Thomas E. Perez, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t. of Labor) (describing how robo-adviser Wealthfront may be able to provide fiduciary
level service at lower cost through technology).
37. See Letter from Jon Stein & Eli Broveman, Founders, Betterment, to U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, Re:
Conflict of Interest Rule, RIN 1210-AB32 (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-comments/1210-AB32-2/03108.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/2ZSS-7W6L] (“[T]he rapidly growing category of automated investment advice is
emerging as a clear rebuttal to those who worry that small accounts will be left unserved. Modern technology allows for fiduciary advice to be delivered at unprecedented scale, with the expected quantum
leap in affordability. We believe that these services, offering lower, transparent prices, fiduciary advice,
and superior experiences, will prevail in the market against heavily conflicted, legacy business models.”).
38. Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts and Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 221 (2017); see
also Ralph Derbyshire & Jay Haines, Department of Labor Rule Shakes Up Retirement Industry, 61 BOS.
BAR J. 18, 19 (2017) (arguing that fiduciary rule should result in increase in accounts managed by roboadvisers).
39. Fiduciary Duty Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 9675 (Exec. Office of the President Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/03/presidential-memorandum-fiduciary-duty-rule
[https://perma.cc/68Z7-H2GH].
40. See, e.g., Carmen Germaine, Further Delay Tees Up Fiduciary Rule for Major Changes,
LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/953235/further-delay-tees-up-fiduciaryrule-for-major-changes [http://perma.cc/8GCC-3F99] (describing Department of Labor plan to delay implementation of not-yet-in-place provisions of fiduciary rule until July 2019).
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providers of investment advice meet a fiduciary standard focused moved the
topic from the regulatory realm into popular culture. 41
D. The Promise of Robo-Advisers
Robo-advisers’ promise is tied to their potential to address these challenges while capitalizing on opportunities technological growth creates.
Robo-advisory firms differ from traditional human investment advisers because they generally do not have as high account minimums for advice and
charge fees that are substantially less than human investment advisers. 42 The
enthusiasm for robo-advisers comes from a belief that they are wellequipped to serve a previously underserved population of investors that includes, but is not limited to millennials—investors with accounts deemed too
small for traditional investment advisers. 43 Investment advisers typically
charge at least 1% of assets under management as fee for their services. 44
Robo-advisers, on the other hand, charge much less, including fees starting
as low as 15 basis points of assets under management. 45 In addition to their
purported ability to provide broader access to financial advice at a lower cost,
41. As one example, comedian John Oliver made the DOL’s fiduciary rule the focus of his popular
late night show, “Last Week Tonight,” describing a rule that had, until then, “been considered too complicated or boring for the average person to understand.” Mark Schoeff, John Oliver’s Criticism Helps
Fiduciary Duty Go Prime Time, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Jun. 19, 2016), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160619/FREE/160619914/john-olivers-criticism-helps-fiduciary-duty-go-primetime [https://perma.cc/X7ZH-YUDN]. The segment has over 6.5 million views on YouTube since it was
posted on June 12, 2016. See LastWeekTonight, Retirement Plans: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver
(HBO), YOUTUBE (June 12, 2016), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvZSpET11ZY.
42. White, supra note 7; Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, SEC (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html
[https://perma.cc/QRJ2XKYH] (“Robo-advisers often seek to offer investment advice for lower costs and fees than traditional
advisory programs, and in some cases require lower account minimums than traditional investment advisers.”).
43. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 2 (“[F]ull-service advisors are looking at robo-advice as a way to
serve smaller accounts and increase advisor productivity.”); id. at 7 (“Part of the excitement surrounding
robo-advice services is their appeal to non-traditional clients, especially younger clients with fewer assets
to manage.”); BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 6 (“For a large segment of the investing public, digital advisory services have the potential to provide affordable and accessible services.”).
44. Desai, supra note 25.
45. Id. (“Fees are competitive and range between 15 to 35 basis points of AUM.”); see also Edwards, supra note 38, at 221 (describing fee structure of one robo-adviser that does not charge any fees
for accounts under $10,000 and 0.25% of assets under management for accounts over $10,000).
A recent study of robo-advisory platforms found that they “present[] investors with an interesting value
proposition—with a price reduction of as much as 70 percent for some services.” ACCENTURE, supra note
4, at 2; see also BD. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA AND
AUTOMATION OF ADVICE TOOLS SURVEYS 4 (2014), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD445.pdf [http://perma.cc/FE7P-TUUF] [hereinafter IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT]
(“From an intermediary’s perspective, providing customers advice through an automated means presents
an opportunity to formulate and deliver advice in a cost effective way.”); CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST
INST., supra note 3, at 11 (“[C]ost, access to advice, and product choice are all viewed as more likely to
have a positive impact on customers.”).
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robo-advisers are heralded for another aspect of the fiduciary rule—the purported ability to provide conflict-free advice at a fiduciary level. 46 Robo-advisers’ promises about the services they can provide are also met with
significant questions, including questions about their limitations and the humans who may potentially introduce flaws into them. 47
II. ROBO-ADVISERS DEFINED
Establishing a single definition of “robo-adviser” presents a problem:
there is no universal platform or design. 48 “Robo-adviser” as colloquially
used encompasses a wide spectrum of services and business models, but all
provide investment advice in a digital format using proprietary algorithms.49
Beyond this common trait, there is substantial variation between robo-advice
platforms, with differences in: (1) end user of the digital advice; (2) range of
investment advice and options provided; and (3) level of human investment
adviser interaction. 50
A. End Users of Robo-Advisor Advice
Robo-advice platforms are both industry- and investor-facing, with users who include financial advisers, investors working without financial advisers, and investors working with financial advisers. 51 The financial
46. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 12 (“Digital advisory services have the potential to significantly
mitigate behavioral finance biases and provide customized investment tools to individual investors at a
relatively low cost.”).
47. Thus, while Professors Tom Baker and Benedict G.C. Dellaert argue that a well-designed roboadviser has the capacity to operate at a greater level than humans, because the humans who design roboadvisers are flawed, robo-advisers may exhibit those flaws. Tom Baker & Benedict G.C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 18–19), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2932189 [http://perma.cc/QS6N-SKBK].
48. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 1 (“Digital advice is not all the same[.]”).
49. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42 (“The term ‘robo-adviser’ generally refers to
an automated digital investment advisory program.”); Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Overview, supra note 8 (describing robo-advisers as “digital investment advisers”); ACCENTURE, supra note
4, at 2 (robo-advice is “the use of automated and digital techniques to build and manage portfolios of
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and other instruments for investors”); Press Release, SEC, SEC Staff Issues Guidance Update and Investor Bulletin on Robo-Advisers (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-52.html [https://perma.cc/MDU4-P9X2] (robo-advisers are
“registered investment advisers that use computer algorithms to provide investment advisory services
online with often limited human interaction”).
50. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42; BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 4 (differences
include “(i) customization, (ii) tax management, (iii) human intervention/oversight, and (iv) type of entity
providing digital advice”).
51. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 2 (2016),
https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/GG8DVK58] (“[I]nvestment advice tools can be broken down into two groups: tools that financial professionals
use, referred to here as ‘financial professional facing’ tools, and tools that clients use, referred to here as
‘client-facing’ tools.”).
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industry has used digital tools for many years, perhaps even without investors’ knowledge. For example, the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) found that firms use digital tools to gather the information upon which human advisers make investment recommendations. 52
Bo Lu, CEO of robo-adviser FutureAdvisor believes that robo-adviser technology assists human investment advisers in serving their clients because
“they can have the digital platform take the workload off them and focus on
things where they add the unique value, such as relationship-building, trustbuilding, and coaching with their clients.” 53 Indeed, some even argue that a
human investment adviser must use the technology available in digital advisory products to fully understand the client and provide the best services. 54
Other platforms using robo-advice are designed with an investor enduser in mind. Though serving the same end-user, these investor-facing roboadvisers comprise myriad tools with varying functionality. 55 On one end of
the spectrum is an advisory firm that integrates robo-advice capabilities with
traditional, human investment advisers. The most simplistic hybrid platforms
obtain information from an investor to develop the customer’s profile so that
a human investment adviser can provide some level of traditional, face-toface advice to an investor. 56 Others offer clients full access to digital investment advisory tools along with human support. Robo-advisory services partnered with a human investment adviser are cited as an option for ensuring
that investor clients with less assets than traditionally managed by an investment adviser can obtain the full- service advice that they may need for their
particular circumstances. 57
On the other end of the spectrum are fully digital robo-advisers that use
an algorithm to review information input by the customer to recommend services from “asset allocation, to tax management, to product selection and
trade execution.” 58 All provided tools are on a digital platform and many of
52. IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 13.
53. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 38; see also BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 6 (“[T]hese
services can be advantageous for financial institutions, including traditional advisors, by automating routine aspects of the client servicing process and providing advisors with greater channels of communications with clients.”).
54. Id. at 55 (Personal Capital’s Mark Goines describing how digital technology improves investment advisers’ advice to their clients).
55. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 51, at 3.
56. Id.
57. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 3, at 13 (“Robo-advisors provide a viable solution for
this segment and, if positioned correctly as part of a full service offering, can serve as a segue to full
service advice for clients with specific needs or higher touch.”); ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 11
(“[R]obo-advice services can be a bet on the future—a way to get customers and financial advisors acclimated to working with machines that can enhance and extend human performance.”).
58. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 1.
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the provided services, such as rebalancing of accounts to meet a pre-determined asset allocation, are accomplished automatically. 59 Robo-adviser service models may include one, all, or several different pieces of the available
customer-facing digital investment tools. 60
B. Range of Advice Provided and Investment Choices Available
Another definitional challenge relates to the range of advice and investment choices robo-advisers provide. 61 The most simplistic digital investment
tools include financial planning targets for different ages and risk profiles
that an investor may find on an investment adviser or broker dealer’s website. 62 Some digital advice tools go a step further and “provide[] a list of
securities, investment funds or model portfolios that may be considered low,
medium, or high risk for investors to choose from based on the customer’s
risk appetite but without detailed information about the individual customer.” 63
The platforms that better fit the name robo-adviser provide tailored financial advice by applying algorithms that analyze and make decisions based
on customer-provided information relating to financial circumstances and
goals. A recent study summarizes the spectrum of advice such providers
give: “Algorithms can range from a simple or pre-packaged algorithm that
builds a single portfolio to a complex multi-strategy algorithm that reviews
thousands of instruments and scenarios in order to construct an aggregate
portfolio based on an individual’s current holdings, investment horizon, and
risk tolerance.” 64 Nevertheless, even the most sophisticated robo-advisers
that provide fully personalized advice based on specific investor inputs typically offer their investors a narrower range of investment choices than traditional investment advisers, often limiting choices to low-cost exchangetraded funds (ETFs) and mutual funds. 65

59. Desai, supra note 25 (“[Robo-advisers’] services include automated portfolio planning, automatic asset allocation, online risk assessments, account rebalancing and other digital tools.”).
60. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., supra note 51, at 2.
61. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3 (“Digital advisors have a number of different investment philosophies, methods, and strategies. The algorithms fueling digital advice very in terms of sophistication.”).
62. IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 7.
63. Id. at 7–8.
64. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 3.
65. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 2; see also IOSCO UPDATE, supra note 21, at 27 (investment
choices include “collective investment schemes, mutual funds, ETFs and equity classes are the most common”); IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45.
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C. Levels of Human Involvement
Robo-advisers may not provide a human touch that some believe essential to the investor adviser/client relationship: the ability to provide in-person
support, comfort, and advice to investors in times of market volatility. 66 The
traditional investment adviser’s “personal touch” is why some predict that
robo-advisers will never entirely replace the traditional, human investment
adviser. 67 Financial industry-backed studies support this prediction, finding
that 74 percent of investors prefer receiving their investment advice from a
human in a volatile market. 68
This does not mean, however, that investors employing robo-advisers
do not interact with humans. The term “robo-adviser” may thus be a misnomer as it may lead investors to believe that financial advice provided through
such a service comes without any human interaction. 69 Mark Goines, vice
chair of digital wealth management firm Personal Capital, says that “we
don’t like the term ‘robo’” because “even robo-advisors aren’t really roboadvisors.” 70 A human touch is required for all robo-advisers, 71 though that
touch differs from that of a traditional human investment adviser by design
so that the cost of the ultimate advice may be lower. 72 Each robo-adviser
makes its own decision about the total level of human involvement, though
there are some common themes. 73 Humans must be involved in the design

66. SEC Investor Advocate Rick Fleming described the role of the investment adviser in working
with clients during rocky markets: “[T]here’s a lot of benefit that comes from the human touch and having
somebody there that’s going to sort of calm the waters and, when the markets are going down, making
sure that investors aren’t making really bad decisions at the worst possible time. And so, I think it, again,
is one of those things that sort of remains to be seen, is how well technology can sort of replicate that and
put those protections into place.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 244. Asquith, supra note 34
(“[F]or many customers robo-advice is a poor substitute for a financial adviser who understand the customer’s needs and guides the customer through market turbulence or life events.”).
67. ACCENTURE, supra note 4, at 5; SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 243 (Attorney John
Walsh describing challenges faced by robo-advisers: “We’re used to face to face human interaction, and
we have confidence in our ability to deal with other people, and that’s why I think, even though Fintech
is booming and growing, personal advice has a big future ahead of it . . . .”).
68. Press Release, Capital One Investing, supra note 21, at 2 (“[W]hen markets are volatile, most
(74 percent) investors would prefer engaging a financial advisor.”).
69. Humans play a significant role in all aspects of FinTech, and scholars predict that will continue
even as financial technology continues to grow and change. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial
Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 580 (2014) [hereinafter Lin, Industry] (describing myriad and key roles
of humans in financial technological changes).
70. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 27.
71. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 4 (“[D]igital advisors have a fundamental obligation to oversee
their systems and mitigate risks associated with digital processes.”).
72. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42.
73. Only one regulatory scheme, that in place in Canada, currently requires that humans either
gather initial customer information or proactively contact an investor if the investor’s responses to an
online questionnaire appears incomplete or provides inconsistent information. See IOSCO UPDATE, supra
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of robo-advice platforms and the proprietary algorithms that deliver advice
to the investor. 74 Other humans ensure that robo-advisers comply with relevant rules and standards, both within the advisory firm and outside the firm
at the regulatory level. 75 Finally, some robo-adviser platforms even permit
their investor customers to work with a live investment adviser as part of
their service model. 76 The availability of such services may be dependent
upon the provider, the amount of assets under management, or the package
elected by the investor. 77 When human interaction is part of a robo-adviser’s
offerings, it does not necessarily mean an in-person discussion with a dedicated investment adviser but may instead be a phone call or electronic access
to a member of an advisory team. 78 In addition to variation across the method
of contacting a human investment adviser, robo-adviser platforms vary in the
frequency with which an investor can reach out to a human adviser. 79
D. Gathering Information and Making Investment Recommendations
Robo-advisers operate through the information they receive from the
end user, which is, in our case, the investor customer. 80 In this way, roboadvisers differ very little from traditional investment advisers in that both are
required to begin by collecting information from their customer in order to
provide investment advice tailored to the individual investor. 81 Human investment advisers typically obtain information to know their customer and
note 21, at 6 (describing Canada’s phone and no-phone rules and requirement for no-phone advisers that
customers be contacted if their responses to an initial questionnaire raise potential concerns).
74. For example, robo-adviser firm Personal Capital’s Mark Goines notes that robo-adviser “tasks
are automated by humans who figure out what algorithms are, assign strategies, interpret data from people.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 27–28.
75. See BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 10 (“We emphasize the need for investment professionals to
be closely involved in the design and oversight of the financial advice tool to ensure that the algorithm
delivers the expected outcome.”).
76. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42. One industry study indicated that investors
appear to value digital advisers coupled with traditional, human investment advisers over digital advice
provided directly to investors with little human interaction. See Press Release, Capital One Investing,
supra note 21, at 2.
77. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42. (“[A] robo-adviser may offer access to a person only for accounts that meet a certain minimum account size.”).
78. Id. (“If a robo-adviser does make an investment professional available to you, the format and
amount of the interaction also may vary.”); id. (“[A] person may be available by email but not by phone.”).
79. Id. (“[A] person may be available . . . only for a limited number of in-person meetings.”).
80. Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Overview, supra note 8 (“[Robo-advisers] offer
discretionary investment advice using algorithms and information provided by the customer.”).
81. For example, securities intermediaries using digital methods for obtaining sufficient information upon which to base a recommendation report (1) that “their tools cover the mandated regulatory
requirements;” (2) “their tools will not permit recommendations to be made unless all necessary information is obtained;” and (3) “they rely on firm account opening policies irrespective of whether the account is opened on-line or in person.” IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 14.
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provide suitable advice from a questionnaire. 82 Robo-advisers obtain the
same categories of information from their customers prior to providing investment advice, also using a form of questionnaire. 83 In both cases, the information comes from the investor, and, in the case when an investment
adviser gives an investor a paper questionnaire to fill out, both the humanand robo- adviser clients provide the initial information on their own. Both
human-based and robo-adviser questionnaires have been criticized for purported failures to obtain full information from which to provide suitable advice to the customer. 84 In addition, regulators warn consumers considering
robo-advisers that it may be up to them to update their profile and financial
circumstances. 85
Robo-advice employs computer algorithms to recommend portfolio
choices based upon the investor’s response to the initial questions posed concerning their background, risk tolerance, and goals. 86 While robo-adviser
proponents argue that computer generated advice lacks the conflicts of interest or behavioral biases of human advisers, others note that algorithms present the greatest risk associated with robo-advisers. 87 Cautions concerning
the use of robo-advisers focus on the potentially limited information upon

82. Michael Tertilt & Peter Scholz, To Advise, or Not to Advise — How Robo-Advisors Evaluate
the Risk Preferences of Private Investors 1 (Jun. 12, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2913178 [https://perma.cc/AV7D-2RFJ] (“Financial advisors typically complete a questionnaire
to evaluate the client’s risk tolerance.”).
83. See, e.g., Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42 (robo-adviser information collection
via online questionnaire); Tertilt & Scholz, supra note 82, at 6–11 (describing robo-adviser information
collection).
84. Tertilt & Scholz, supra note 82, at 3 (“[Human] questionnaires commonly used by financial
planners do not adhere to psychometric standards; they are generally too brief (a reliability problem) and
contain too many ‘bad’ questions (a validity problem).”).
85. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42 (“[T]he burden to update this information will
fall on you.”).
86. Algorithms are not new. Financial intermediaries began using them decades ago to replace roles
formerly processed by humans. See, e.g., Arthur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers
and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 423 (2009) (describing introduction of ECNs and use of
algorithms in the 1990s to automate trade executions and replace human judgment).
87. CHARTERED FIN. ANALYST INST., supra note 3, at 14 (“46% of respondents note that flaws in
automated financial advice algorithms could be the biggest risk introduced from automated financial advice tools, followed by mis-selling (30%) and privacy and data protection concerns (12%).”); see also
Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance, Technology, and Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 159,
180 (2016) [hereinafter Lin, Compliance] (“Uncertainty and risk in finance can never be perfectly modeled, reduced, or eliminated. Despite all the advances in new financial technology and artificial intelligence, there exists no machine so smart that it flawlessly forecasts financial futures and economic risks
in a world filled with flawed, whimsical, and random human actors.”).
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which algorithm relies. 88 One recent study focusing on a subset of international robo-advisers found that, on average, robo-advisers ask few questions
and only use responses from a small proportion of those questions to generate their advice. 89 Industry experts recommend robust due diligence into and
supervision of algorithms. 90 In the same way that a traditional investment
adviser must know her customer and obtain a wide range of information in
order to provide suitable advice, the means through which robo-advisers provide their advice—proprietary algorithms—require robust inputs and are
only as good as the information upon which they base their calculations and
recommendations. 91
Although the robo-adviser designation can describe multiple models,
end users, and degrees of human involvement, this essay will focus on roboadvisory platforms with the investor client as the anticipated end user of a
digital platform that predominately delivers investment advice via proprietary algorithms, including models where the client has access to a human
investment adviser for additional support.
III. REGULATION OF ROBO-ADVISERS UNDER CURRENT SCHEME AND
IN THE FUTURE
Robo-advisers face a dual challenge and opportunity: can they provide
investment advisory services meeting a fiduciary standard under the 1940
Act? 92 The 1940 Act was the final major financial legislation arising out of

88. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, supra note 42; Horacio A. Valeiras, Expert’s Corner: Portfolio Construction Highly Dependent on the Initial Conditions, 23 PIABA B.J. 75, 75–76 (2016) (“However, as with so many so-called investment panaceas, many of the robo-adviser models can lead to flawed
portfolio construction decisions caused by poorly analyzed assumptions and historical data.”).
89. Tertilt & Scholz, supra note 82, at 19 (“In our sample, the robo-advisors pose around ten questions, but only about ca. 60% of questions actually have an impact on the risk categorization . . . The
recommended portfolios derived from robo-advice seem to be rather conservative.”).
90. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 10 (“A number of key questions to be asked when conducting
due diligence on the algorithm include: (i) whether the algorithm factors in transaction costs or termination fees, if any; (ii) whether the algorithm factors in tax implications and, if so, does it have the cost basis
of each asset; and (iii) whether the algorithm factors in the level of risk that is appropriate for the consumer, especially if the consumer has limited financial knowledge and experience.”).
91. BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 9 (“Digital advisors, like traditional advisors, are dependent on
client-provided information to gauge suitability, which is typically obtained through questionnaires. The
information gathered from these questionnaires should be used to make appropriate recommendations to
clients.”); SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 65 (“I think it’s malpractice to not understand a client
and make a recommendation to them, and algorithms with minimal input run the risk of not fully understanding the client.”).
92. White, supra note 7 (“So, in this area, the key questions are focused on whether and how a firm
meets its Advisers Act obligations, as well as its fiduciary duties, when it provides only or primarily
automated advice.”).
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the Great Depression and its focus was on a new breed of professionals: investment advisers who received compensation from clients to recommend
investment strategies. 93 At that time, little was known about the investment
adviser industry and the 1940 Act was perceived as an opportunity to learn
about the industry and collect the names of all practicing in the new arena. 94
Though it is well known today that investment advisers subject to the 1940
Act owe their clients a fiduciary duty, the 1940 Act was promulgated without
the term fiduciary within it. It was not until twenty years later that duties
owed by investment advisers to their clients were first addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Capital Gains Research Bureau v. SEC, after which full
disclosure became a hallmark of the fiduciary standard owed from investment advisers to their clients. 95 In subsequent cases, courts continued to
shape the contours of the duties owed to investor advisers’ clients. 96 Since
then, the fiduciary duty owed under the 1940 Act has been defined as requiring disclosure, avoiding conflicts of interest, and acting in the customer’s
best interest. 97
Although lawyers representing both human and robo-advisers have
weighed in on whether robo-advisers can meet the requirements of the 1940
Act, there is little in legal scholarship addressing whether robo-advisers can

While it is possible that some robo-advisers are operating as broker-dealers, most direct to customer platforms appear to be operating as investment advisers. Accordingly, the remainder of this essay will discuss
the investment adviser regulatory framework rather than the duties owed by broker-dealers.
93. Karmel, supra note 13, at 406 (“As the last of the New Deal securities laws that date between
1933 and 1940, the Advisers Act was probably the least considered and the least important. It was a weak
statute, which accomplished little more than creating a registration list of investment advisers.”).
94. Note, Investment Advisers and Disclosure of an Intent to Trade, 71 YALE L.J. 1342, 1342
(1962) (“[R]elatively little was known about the practices of investment advisers; in fact, the act was in
large part designed to acquire information about the industry.”); see also Laby, supra note 86, at 403
(“[L]ittle was known about the number of investment advisers operating at the time or the amount of
assets they managed.”); id. (1940 Act “little more than a ‘compulsory census’”).
95. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term—Dealing by Advisers in Recommended Securities, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 292, 294 (1964) (“By interpreting the act to require full disclosure in any situation in which there
is a possibility of bias, the client himself may evaluate the disinterestedness of the advice.”).
96. Karmel, supra note 13, at 410–411 (describing development of fiduciary duty for investment
advisers through judicial decisions).
97. Irwin et al., supra note 28, at 59.
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be fiduciaries. 98 Nevertheless, robo-advisers avail themselves to that framework, assuming its applicability and their ability to live up to it. 99 Federal
regulators believe robo-advisers are subject to the 1940 Act just as human
advisers are. 100 The SEC thus holds robo-advisers to the fiduciary standard. 101 SIFMA, a group representing the securities industry, appears to agree,
stating that it is possible for robo-advisers to meet the fiduciary standard. 102
Only Massachusetts regulators so far present a contrary opinion, writing in a
policy statement that they do not believe that one subset of robo-advisers,
98. Representing the traditional advisory community, lawyer Melanie Fein argues that robo-advisers cannot meet the 1940 Act’s standards. See Melanie L. Fein, Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look 1 (Nov.
14, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2658701 [http://perma.cc/V3ZR-44LQ]
[hereinafter Fein, Closer Look] (Robo-advisors “are not designed for retirement accounts subject to
ERISA and should be approached with caution by retail and retirement investors looking for personal
investment advice.”); Melanie L. Fein, FINRA’s Report on Robo-Advisors: Fiduciary Implications 8
(Apr. 1, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2768295 [https://perma.cc/Q8WYHQQC] [hereinafter Fein, Fiduciary Implications] (questioning whether robo-advisers can meet fiduciary
standard). On the other hand, lawyers at a firm that represents robo-advisers argue that robo-advisers do
meet the fiduciary standard. See JENNIFER L. KLASS & ERIC PERELMAN, MORGAN LEWIS, THE
EVOLUTION OF ADVICE: DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVISERS AS FIDUCIARIES 17 (2016), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/publication/report/im-the-evolution-of-advice-digital-investment-advisersas-fiduciaries-october-2016.ashx?la=en&hash=7A28D9586FD8ACADC9731733BFE4281F4E6FEB49
[https://perma.cc/EW5K-Q9VQ] (“[D]igital advisers are capable of fulfilling fiduciary standards that are
consistent with the scope and nature of the advisory services that they provide to clients.”). With a view
towards the greater financial services industry, two scholars have proposed some guiding principles from
which a robo regulatory scheme can be developed. See Baker & Dellaert, supra note 47 (“[W]e propose
a regulatory trajectory, rather than a regulatory agenda, that starts by building the necessary human capital
and only then will move to setting an agenda.”).
99. See IOSCO UPDATE, supra note 21, at 4 (finding in study of international securities regulators
that majority of regulatory frameworks “are technology neutral and do not differentiate between advice
or portfolio management delivered by a human and that delivered by a software package, possibly with a
human interface overlay”); id. at 10 (reporting FINRA/SEC response to survey that concerns related to
robo-advisers “also apply in the context of more traditional advisors and are unique only to the extent that
robo advisors place greater emphasis on technology”).
100. Earlier this year, the SEC stated that digital investment advice under the Investment Advisers
Act is no different than human-directed financial advice: “Robo-advisers, as registered investment advisers, are subject to the substantive and fiduciary obligations of the Advisers Act.” SEC, supra note 49.
Similarly, IOSCO’s 2014 international study on digital investment tools reported that “[a]ll but one regulator responding to the survey stated that the rules governing advice/recommendations apply irrespective
of whether the advice/recommendations were made by automated tools or otherwise.” IOSCO SOCIAL
MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 23. Further, IOSCO found that regulators’ guidance to firms “on areas
such as disclosure, the provision of advice, supervision, AML, advertising and assessment is technology
neutral . . . [and] applies irrespective of whether the advice is given by telephone, email, internet, faceto-face or by a combination of these or other ways.” Id. at 22; see also White, supra note 7 (“Providing
financial advisory services electronically is different than the traditional adviser model, but in many respects our [the SEC’s] assessment of robo-advisors is no different than for a human-based investment
adviser.”).
101. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE: ROBO-ADVISORS 2 (2017) [hereinafter
SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE] (“Robo-advisers, like all registered investment advisers, are subject to the
substantive and fiduciary obligations of the Advisers’ Act.”).
102. Digital Investment Advice Resource Center Overview, supra note 8 (“Digital investment advisers can fulfill their fiduciary duties under the law so long as they act in good faith, disclose the material
facts, and use reasonable care not to mislead clients.”).
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those that are fully automated, can meet a fiduciary duty. 103 The consensus
appears to be that since robo-advisers are availing themselves to the 1940
Act, it is up to robo advice providers to ensure, and prove, that they can comply with it. 104
If the robo-adviser industry is voluntarily availing itself to the 1940 Act,
regulators’ next step should be to test whether robo-advisers are meeting the
1940 Act’s requirements. Such an inquiry should use the current regulatory
toolkit of disclosure, investigation, and enforcement. 105 The SEC appears to
be pursuing this approach. For example, a February 2017 staff guidance update concerning robo-advisers identified three areas that robo-advisers
should ensure they are meeting to be in compliance with the 1940 Act: (1)
adequate and effective disclosure; (2) collection of information to deliver
suitable advice; and (3) effective compliance systems. 106 Following up
through investigation and pursuing enforcement for additional information
will provide regulators with information that can guide their next steps, including whether the current regulatory regime is sufficient or if new regulations are needed. Indeed, due to President Trump’s moratorium on new
regulation unless two other regulations are discarded, such an approach may
be preferable to creating new regulation specifically to address robo-advisers. 107 While it seems counterintuitive, refraining from regulation until more
103. See MASS. SEC. DIV., POLICY STATEMENT: ROBO-ADVISERS AND STATE INVESTMENT
ADVISER REGISTRATION 1 (2016) (“[I]t is the position of the Division that fully automated robo-advisers,
as currently structured, may be inherently unable to carry out the fiduciary obligations of a state-registered
investment adviser.”); id. at 3 (defining fully automated robo-adviser as including following criteria: “(1)
do not meet with or conduct significant (or any) due diligence on a client, (2) provide investment advice
that is minimally personalized, (3) may fail to meet the high standard of care that is imposed on the
appropriateness of investment advisers’ investment decision-making, and (4) specifically decline the obligation to act in a client’s best interests”); id. at 4 (Massachusetts’ Securities Division does nevertheless
believe that “robo-advisers and traditional advisers shoulder the same fiduciary duty.”).
104. See, e.g., Iris H-Y Chiu, Fintech and Disruptive Business Models in Financial Products, Intermediation and Markets – Policy Implications for Financial Regulators, 21 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 55, 90
(2016) (“[I]t is for the providers of such automated portals to demonstrate that they meet the same standards of suitability as those imposed on investment advisers generally.”); KLASS & PERELMAN, supra note
98, at 17 (lawyers for robo-advisers arguing that robo-adviser platform “fits entirely within the existing
regulatory framework governing investment advisers”).
105. There may also be a role for the private bar to take in ensuring that robo-advisers operating
under the 1940 Act live up to their fiduciary standards. See, e.g., Diana Novak Jones, Morningstar, Prudential Face Class Action Over Robo-Adviser, LAW360 (Aug. 4, 2017) https://www.law360.com/articles/951428/morningstar-prudential-face-class-action-over-robo-adviser
[https://perma.cc/3A9CPMNH] (describing putative class action alleging that investment advisers conspired to develop a roboadviser that directed clients to high fee investments for benefit of advisers).
106. SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 2.
107. Exec. Order No. 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg.
9339 (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presidential-executiveorder-reducing-regulation-and-controlling [https://perma.cc/FX3V-HTZC] (“Unless prohibited by law,
whenever an executive department or agency (agency) publicly proposes for notice and comment or otherwise promulgates a new regulation, it shall identify at least two existing regulations to be repealed.”).
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information about the industry emerges is a commonly used approach and
recommended by some scholars as a means of evaluating technological innovation in the financial industry. 108
Thus, before proposing regulatory changes to address the proliferation
of robo-advisers, regulators should reflect upon the evolution of the 1940
Act and similarities between that time and today. Like the then-new investment adviser category of professionals that Congress hoped to learn about
through the 1940 Act, robo-advisers are not an entirely well-known, uniform,
or understood entity. 109 As regulators did in developing the contours of the
1940 Act, existing rules and regulatory tools should be used to develop
knowledge about how robo-advisers operate before constructing new regulation. 110 For example, the SEC can employ enforcement actions as it did in
the early decades of the 1940 Act to learn about the robo-adviser industry,
test whether the existing contours of the 1940 Act’s fiduciary standard apply
to robo-advisers, and consider refining or expanding those contours as has
been done in the past when the industry changed. 111
In particular, because disclosure is a “bedrock principle of federal securities law,” 112 it should remain a key focus of regulators as they determine
108. See, e.g., Chiu, supra note 104, at 63 (“[T]he regulatory engagement with financial innovation
has always been one of relative passivity and catch-up. Regulators, cautious of not impeding the development of competitive innovation and choice for consumers, often dismantle regulatory barriers to support competition or refrain from adding such barriers. This is because much of financial innovation
depends on low cost and flexible models, which would be stifled by the high cost of regulation. Thus,
regulators often take a ‘wait and see’ approach, preferring to monitor developments regulating financial
innovation.”); id. at 94 (“The judgment-based approach championed internationally and in the United
Kingdom can form the basis for a regulatory approach that adopts early monitoring and reflective consideration of the key aspects of fintech innovation in terms of ‘change,’ ‘substitutive potential,’ and ‘structural impact.’”).
This approach is not without its risks. See, e.g., Lin, Compliance, supra note 87, at 166 (2016) (“[F]inancial innovation frequently finds roots in attempts to evade or arbitrage new regulation.”). Regulators could
be perceived as not protecting the investing public, and any scandal or crisis involving robo-advisers
before regulators have crafted specific regulations may then result in over-regulation. See, e.g., id. at 166–
168 (describing over-regulation after economic crises, followed with cycle of deregulation in future years,
which increase compliance costs).
109. See Arthur B. Laby, Models of Securities Regulation in the United States, 25 FORDHAM INT’L
L. J. 20, 26 (1999) (describing objections to regulation of investment advisers before promulgation of
1940 Act including “that the profession was not yet mature enough to be regulated”).
110. Internationally, regulators are already taking this approach. IOSCO reports that eight regulators, including FINRA and the SEC, “reported that their existing rules appear to be sufficient at the present
time to cover automated advice tools . . . .” IOSCO UPDATE, supra note 21, at 13.
111. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 13, at 407 (“As frequently occurs when the SEC is unable to
engage in rulemaking, it has attempted to impose its views concerning proper conduct upon investment
managers through enforcement actions.”). Use of enforcement as an after-the-fact tool to regulate financial intermediaries is not without criticism, with some arguing for regulation before enforcement. See
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Preserving Human Agency in Automated Compliance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 71, 81–83 (2016) (describing critiques of enforcement as regulatory tool and shift towards
prophylactic regulatory scheme).
112. Black, supra note 13, at 306–07.
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what, if any, additional regulatory is necessary. Disclosure is a crucial aspect
of fiduciary relationships because it goes to the heart of trust, the very relationship that some believe hardest for robo-advisers to achieve without a human touch. 113 It is therefore not surprising that the robo-adviser industry and
regulators alike recognize the important role disclosures play in transparency
relating to robo-advisers’ operations, algorithms, limitations and assumptions. 114 Regulators have already begun to focus on the quality and content
of robo-adviser disclosures to ensure their compliance with the 1940 Act,
concerned that customers will not fully understand what specifically the
robo-adviser is providing to them. 115 Scholars similarly argue that disclosure
should be a key component of future regulation applicable to artificial intelligence’s growth in the financial industry. 116
Disclosure is not, however, a miracle cure that renders robo-advisers
appropriate for every, or even any, investor. 117 Indeed, commentators criticize current robo-advisers operating under the 1940 Act for purportedly using their disclosures to limit the scope and character of their relationship with
clients in an entirely permissible manner, but one that investors may not understand. 118 From the time of the Capital Gains definition of fiduciary responsibilities owed by the investment adviser to the client, commentators
113. SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 18 (“[T]he most interesting part of this sort of disruption
is that the paradigm of how we establish trust online is changing”). Others in the industry similarly believe
that from an investor protection standpoint, FinTech boils down to trust. See, e.g., id. at 234 (“Are they
[robo-advisers] trustworthy? And it’s not just does it work or is the disclosure right, but what is it about
it that will make it trustworthy. . .?”).
114. Both the industry and regulators seem to agree the complete and clear disclosure of key elements of robo-advisers is required. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, supra note 9, at 10 (“[D]igital advisors should
disclose to clients the limits of their services and their dependence on client-provided information.”); id.
at 9 (“It is important that digital advisors reasonably design their algorithms based on their stated investment strategies and methods and make appropriate disclosures to clients concerning such investment
strategies and methods.”); SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 3–6 (describing quality, quantity, and form of disclosure that robo-advisers may need to meet requirements of 1940 Act); Investor
Alert: Automated Investment Tools, SEC (May 8, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/autolistingtoolshtm.html [https://perma.cc/SQ5D-S39D] (advising investors to “[r]eview all relevant
disclosures for an automated investment tool”).
115. See, e.g., SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 3–6 (describing special considerations for disclosure that may apply to robo-advisers due to their unique features); IOSCO UPDATE, supra
note 21, at 11 (describing regulators’, including FINRA and SEC, “concerns about customers lacking
awareness of, or not understanding, the limitations of automated advice tools. Clients may not understand
the service offered; for example that the automated advice tool may not consider their full financial and
personal circumstances.”); MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 103, at 1 (listing six items as minimum required
disclosure).
116. Lin, Industry, supra note 69, at 599–603 (arguing for enhanced disclosure as component of
multi-part framework for regulating “cy-fi”).
117. See generally Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U. CIN. L.
REV. 421 (2012).
118. Fein, Closer Look, supra note 98, at 3; Fein, Fiduciary Implications, supra note 98, at 6. But
see KLASS & PERELMAN, supra note 98, at 7 (arguing that investment advisers may limit the scope of
their relationship with clients).
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suggested that disclosure may not be an effective device. 119 Investor uses of
and actions after disclosure are sometimes unintended or illogical. 120 Disclosures to consumer investors in the mutual fund context, a type of investment
that appeals to the same retail investors as robo-advisers, have been criticized
as too dense and difficult to read, let alone understand, even before SEC plain
English requirements. 121 Regulators should recommend robo-adviser disclosures that do not suffer from this critique. 122
In addition to using current tools, it is imperative that, along a parallel
track, the current regulatory tools be studied to determine their efficacy in
protecting consumers. For example, studying retail investor understanding
of robo-adviser disclosures will provide valuable information from which to
further evaluate this key tool. 123 Thus, in addition to reviewing robo-adviser
disclosures for completeness and accuracy, outside studies should be conducted to evaluate consumers’ comprehension of disclosures being made to
them. 124 These studies should incorporate a focus beyond behavioral finance
and cognitive biases and start with a threshold of comprehension. In particular, studies should incorporate experts in adult literacy to determine whether
and how much information in disclosures is being comprehended and to develop best practices for crafting effective disclosures that will allow investors to truly understand the contours of their relationship with their roboadviser. 125
119. A case note describing the Capital Gains decision at the time of its issuance noted flaws inherent in disclosure. The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, supra note 95, at 295 (“If the investing public is truly
naïve, disclosure does not provide a realistic method of protection.”).
120. See, e.g., Laby, supra note 86, at 429–430 (describing concerns with disclosure of conflicts of
interest as including lack of filtering of information between conflicted principal and client, understanding the magnitude of bias the disclosed conflict creates, and focusing on investor and exclusion of how
the disclosure impacts the discloser’s actions); Troy A Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 441-443 (2003) (describing
information overload and impact on decision making).
121. See, e.g., Black, supra note 13, at 325–27 (describing mutual fund disclosures as “dismal,” too
complicated, and difficult to digest).
122. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for Effective Professional Disclosure, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 40) (arguing that disclosures for a
“Professional Prospectus” that would allow consumers to have more information about professional service providers should presents “information in a short, standardized, and clear format”).
123. See Black, supra note 13, at 333 (“To state the obvious, the purpose of disclosure should be to
provide useful information to investors.”); Paredes, supra note 120, at 418 (describing two necessary
components of disclosure’s efficacy: that information is disclosed and that end users of the disclosure
“use the disclosed information effectively”).
124. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 120, at 420 (advocating “more empirical research to better understand how investors process information and make investment decisions”); id. (“[T]he federal securities
laws could be improved by accounting for how investors actually process information and make decisions.”).
125. Black, supra note 13, at 337 (“[T]he likelihood that investors will be forced to participate in
markets that they do not understand and that they do not perceive as fair should drive current reform
efforts.”); Paredes, supra note 120, at 432 (“[F]or our mandatory disclosure system to work, securities
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Moreover, it is necessary to explore the means of disclosure in addition
to retail investors’ base comprehension of it. Robo-advisers’ technological
innovations may be effective in deploying disclosures to retail investors. 126
Accordingly, regulators should explore robo-advisers’ technological capacities to deliver disclosures in a fashion more relevant to today’s investors. 127
While technology could address some of the critiques of information overload associated with disclosures in investing, challenges nevertheless remain. 128 Robo-advisers provide an interesting opportunity to determine if,
and how, their purportedly consumer-friendly technology can be deployed
to increase efficacy and consumer comprehension of disclosures. 129 For example, regulators and robo-advisers alike could explore robo-adviser capabilities to track whether and to what extent their customer users read and
understand disclosures and follow up with those consumers who may need
additional attention to fully understand. 130

market participants must not only have access to information, but must be able to search and process in
an effective manner the information that is disclosed.”).
126. See, e.g., SEC, IM GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 101, at 5–6 (describing how consumer engagement with robo-advisory platforms may require different format and character of disclosures involving technological innovation). In recent years, regulators have focused attention to the collection and
dissemination of data in formats that will permit regulators and scholars to interpret and use the data with
the hope that retail investors may also be able to benefit from the information. See Dombalagian, supra
note 111, at 74–75 (describing regulatory efforts to standardize and automate information relating to disclosures for more meaningful use); Paredes, supra note 120, at 479–480 (advocating for investor education and training coupled with decision aids to encourage more effective investor use of disclosure).
127. Investor Advocate Rick Fleming has argued that current disclosure regimes have not kept up
with how Americans access information and that “new technologies give us new opportunities to provide
disclosure that is both comprehensive and comprehensible. Times have changed, and so should the delivery of information to investors.” Rick A. Fleming, Inv’r Advocate, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Effective
Disclosure for the 21st Century Investor, (Feb. 20, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/022015spchraf.html [https://perma.cc/4XN4-7297].
128. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Disclosure 2.0: Can Technology Solve Overload, Complexity and
Other Information Failures?, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1167–1180 (2016) (discussing technology’s potential and challenges in addressing informational overload and complexity issues investors face in assessing
securities and arguing for evidence to inform disclosure initiatives); id. at 1146 (“Can new technologies
help investors understand complex firms, particularly financial institutions, as well as complex financial
instruments and markets, while not overtaxing the cognitive abilities of individuals? Investors need a rich
set of information to value firms and securities, but the fear is that they cannot process too much information or that too much information will exacerbate behavioral biases and prompt cognitive errors.”).
129. See Lin, Industry, supra note 69, at 601 (arguing that “policymakers should examine new ways
to leverage technology towards creating a better, more workable disclosure framework”)
130. For example, Canadian regulators require robo-advisers to follow up with a telephone call to
any investor whose response to online initial information appears to be incorrect or inconsistent. See
IOSCO SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, supra note 45, at 6. Robo-advisers could develop algorithms to determine whether customers need additional disclosure mechanisms if, for example, they have not spent a
certain amount of time on a disclosure page before acknowledging that they have read it.
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CONCLUSION
Robo-advisory platforms, as newer entrants to an established advisory
industry, challenge convention and will disrupt the provision of financial advisory services in the future. Though “robo-adviser” is currently synonymous with innovation, the industry’s swift growth may render the services it
provides so ubiquitous that the term will fade away. 131 Yet the means through
which advice is provided is not fully understood and will continue to
evolve. 132 Operating within an existing framework, the robo-advisers now
regulated under the 1940 Act will challenge regulators to examine and articulate the parameters of the fiduciary duties they owe to the clients and how
those duties will be met. However, just as with the promulgation of the 1940
Act, the application of the current regulatory regime to a new breed of advisers will guide regulators and shape investor protection policy after study
and real-world experiences inform direction and identify needs and gaps.
The new breed of investment advisers, robo-advisers, provide regulators
with an opportunity to refocus on the core principles of the 1940 Act and use
their current tool kit to guide future activity while evaluating whether the
technology itself affords opportunities to better ensure that the consumer
protection aspect of disclosure actually results in fully informed consumers.

131. In the SEC’s FinTech forum, robo-advisor Betterment’s CEO Ben Alden described how roboadvisers may be subsumed into the lexicon of financial services as they continue to grow: “We don’t use
“online brokerage” or “discount brokerage” quite the way that it was in the, you know, ‘80s–’90s, and I
think, similarly, “robo-adviser” will drop away.” SEC, FINTECH FORUM, supra note 4, at 71.
132. See, e.g., Lin, Compliance, supra note 87, at 163 (arguing that technology will continue to
transform all aspects of financial industry in future years).

